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Probate Reform in California
by RUSSELL NILES*
Introduction
Interest in the reform of probate law is difficult to generate. Law-
yers who specialize in estate practice are skillful in applying existing
law, and have a natural reluctance to adopt new forms and proce-
dures.' Nevertheless, changes in family structure and the nature of
modern society require a reexamination of this ancient and traditional
subject,2 and there appears to be growing interest in reform. 3
Over the years various professional groups have been concerned
with reform. Revised statutes sometimes have resulted from the efforts
of special legislative commissions which have studied and reconsidered
all aspects of both substantive and procedural law relating to dece-
dents' estates.4 An important contribution to systematic reform was
made in 1946 when A ModelProbate Code was drafted by scholars at
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versity of Montana 1924, LL.B. 1925, LL.D. 1953; J.S.D. Yale University, 1931; Chairman,
Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, American Bar Association, 1956; Adviser,
Restatement of the Law Second, Trusts 2d, 1959; President, Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, 1966-1968.
1. As Professor Eugene Scoles has stated: "The debate in probate reform is largely a
lawyer's debate with one side urging change and the other responding that the change is not
worth the cost. Some lawyer resistance follows from genuine doubt, other from self-interest
in the working knowledge of the system within which one is operating with profitable assur-
ance. . . . [B]ut the legal profession has a singular responsibility to implement efforts to
improve those areas of the law, such as probate, which do not excite the support of the
professional lobbyists, the institutions of commerce or political leaders." Scoles, Probate
Reform in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 139-40 (E. Hallbach ed. 1977).
2. See Cavers, Change in the American Famiy and the "Laughing Heir, " 20 IOWA L.
REV. 203 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Cavers].
3. For a running account of the activities of legislatures, commissions, bar associa-
tions, and other organizations involved in the probate reform movement, see UPC NOTES,
Nos. 1-23 (R. Wellman ed. 1972-1979) [hereinafter cited as UPC NOTES]. See also law re-
view commentaries cited after UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-101 (UNIFORM LAWS ANNO-
TATED Supp. 1979).
4. For the most exhaustive recent studies on reform of probate law, see NEW YORK
STATE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFI-
CATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE Ist-
6th, N.Y. LEGISLATIVE Doc. No. 19 (1962-1967) [hereinafter cited as BENNETT COMMISSION
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the University of Michigan, with the active collaboration of the Section
on Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law of the American Bar Associ-
ation.- The Model Probate Code (MPC), with its supporting
monographs, 6 has been of great assistance to many state legislatures.
The MPC was intended to be a model only, not a uniform law. A
generation after the publication of the MPC, however, the same Section
of the American Bar Association began a movement to draft a uniform
code. With so many persons crossing state boundaries at various stages
in their lifetimes, uniformity was perceived to be increasingly impor-
tant. After six years of study and research under the auspices of the
Section, successive revisions, and consideration of many points of view,
the Uniform Probate Code7 (UPC) finally was approved by the Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws and the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association in 1969.8 The UPC has been adopted in
nine states,9 adopted in substantial part in three states,10 and is being
REPORTS]. This commission, chaired by J.D. Bennett, generated a total of 3781 pages in its
six reports.
Other legislative commissions have been at work in various states as mentioned in UPC
NOTES, supra note 3. Recent examples include Arkansas, id. No. 21 at 2 (1977); and Maine,
id. No. 20 at 3 (1977).
5. ABA Model Probate Code Committee, A Model Probate Code, in PROBLEMS IN
PROBATE LAW 1 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Model Probate Code]. See Niles, ModelProbate
Code andMonographs on Probate Law: A Review, 45 MICH. L. REV. 321 (1946); Rheinstein,
The Model Probate Code, A Critique, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 534 (1948); Simes, Preface to
PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW at v (1946).
6. Simes & Basye, Monographs on Problems in Probate Law in PROBLEMS IN PROBATE
LAW 383 (1946).
7. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 1-101 to 8-102.
8. Wellman, The New Probate Code, 56 A.B.A.J. 636 (1970); Wellman, The Uniform
Probate Code.: Blueprintfor Reform in the 70s, 2 CONN. L. REV. 453 (1970). For a list of the
special committees, the liaison committees, the chairmen, reporters, and members of the
Joint Editorial Board, see UNIFORM PROBATE CODE xxiii. See also AVERILL, UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE IN A NUTSHELL ch. I (West 1978).
9. Alaska, 1972 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 78 (codified at ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.06.005 to
13.36.100) (effective Jan. 1, 1973); Arizona, 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 78 (codified at ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-1101 to 14-7307) (effective Jan. 1, 1974); Colorado, 1973 Colo. Sess.
Laws ch. 451 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-10-1-1 to 15-17-101) (effective July 1,
1974); Idaho, 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 111 (codified at IDAHO CODE §§ 15-1-101 to 15-7-
307) (effective July 1, 1972); Minnesota, 1974 Minn. Laws ch. 442 (codified at MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 524.1-101 to 524.8-103) (West) (effective Aug. 1, 1975); Nebraska, 1974 Neb. Laws
at 130 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2201 to 30-2902) (effective Jan. 1, 1977); New
Mexico, 1975 N.M. Laws ch. 257 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-1-101 to 32A-7-401)
(effective July 1, 1976); North Dakota, 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 257 (codified at N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 30.1-01-01 to 30.1-35-0 1) (effective July 1, 1975); Utah, 1975 Utah Laws ch. 150
(codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to 75-8-101) (effective July 1, 1977).
South Dakota adopted the UPC in 1974 but repealed it in 1976. See Wellman, The
U.P.C. Defeat in South Dakota, UPC NOTES, supra note 3, No. 20 at 5. The Wyoming
Legislature twice approved the UPC but the Governor vetoed the bill each time. Id. at 2.
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considered by state commissions, legislative committees, and bar as-
sociations in many other states."
Shortly after the UPC was promulgated, the Board of Governors
of the State Bar of California appointed a committee of judges and
lawyers to study the UPC. The committee made its report in 1973,12
and noted in the introduction that "[t]he California Probate System has
enjoyed the reputation of being one of the best and most efficiently
operated in the United States."' 13 Starting from this premise, the com-
mittee conducted a detailed analysis and critique of the UPC, summa-
rizing its conclusions as follows:
The California Legislature has been attentive to the need for
constantly updating and modernizing the California Probate Code
and, in fact, more than 120 changes and amendments have been
made in the California Probate Code in the last five year period. To
repeal a system of laws that reflects the public policy of this State,
carefully honed and refined over a great number of years, for an Act
which ... strips the system of laws of even minimal safeguards for
the persons beneficially interested in a decedent's estate ... would
be a mistake from which it would take California years to recover.
The Analysis and Critique relates to California Law and is not
intended as a condemnation of the UPC. The UPC may well be an
improvement over the laws of many of the states of the United
States. In each state the question must be: "Will the adoption of the
Uniform Probate Code constitute an improvement over the existing
probate system?" In California the answer is a firm and confident
'No."'4
10. Florida, 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-106 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 731.005 to
735.302) (West) (effective July 1, 1975); Hawaii, 1976 Hawaii Sess. Laws No. 200 (effective
July 1, 1976); New Jersey, UPC NOTES, supra Note 3, No. 22 at 1, 5.
II. See UPC NOTES, supra note 3. The UPC is being considered in over half of the
states in which it has not been adopted. Some 24 states have adopted a self-proved will
provision like UPC § 2-504, id. No. 22 at 3-5, and 36 states have adopted a durable power
statute like §§ 5-501 and 5-502, id. No. 22 at 6. States that have reported substantial pro-
gress toward probate reform include Delaware, id. No. 20 at 2; the District of Columbia, id.
No. 20 at 2; Maine, id. No. 20 at 3, 5; Michigan, id. No. 21 at 9; Missouri, id. No. 15 at 3;
Ohio, id. No. 20 at 5.
12. THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE: ANALYSIS AND
CRITIQUE Xi-Xiii (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. In 1974 the Joint Editorial Board for
the Uniform Probate Code published a response to the Report. JOINT EDITORIAL BOARD
FOR THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, RESPONSE OF THE JOINT EDITORIAL BOARD (1974).
13. REPORT, supra note 12, at xi.
14. Id. at xxxiii-xxxiv. Some lawyers who otherwise support the UPC agree with the
committee with respect to informal probate without prior notice to beneficiaries. Two states
which adopted the UPC later added a notice requirement. See 59 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1975)
(citing 1975 Minn. Laws ch. 347, § 34, and 1974 Neb. Laws No. 354, § 98(c)).
Not all of the comments of California lawyers and scholars have been so negative. See
McClanahan, Changing Concepts in the Law of Wills and Probate, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 274
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The principal objections of the committee were to Article III of the
UPC which provides more flexible and informal procedures and more
independent estate administration than the committee thought safe.
Rather than supporting the UPC, the State Bar endorsed the Independ-
ent Administration of Estates Act, which was adopted in California in
1974.15 This Act has been criticized for not going far enough in al-
lowing independent administration,' 6 but until the statute has been
given a fair trial pressing for adoption of Article III of the UPC hardly
is realistic.
There is, however, no reason that the adoption of Article II, relat-
ing to the substantive law of family rights, intestate succession, and
wills, cannot be considered separately. In fact, the State Bar committee
was less critical of Article II and expressly approved some of its sec-
tions. 17
Despite the many recent changes in the California Probate Code
(CPC) noted by the State Bar Committee,' 8 there unfortunately has
been no thorough revision of the substantive provisions of the CPC for
over a century. Changes have been piecemeal, often restricted to a spe-
cific section relating to a topic of current public interest, such as alien-
age,' 9 adoption,20 or succession by children born out of wedlock. 2'
Much of the CPC has not changed since it was copied from the Texas
Code in 1850,22 or modified by the Field Code in 1872.23 In its phrase-
ology, in its excessive detail, even in many of its premises, it is a nine-
teenth century code.24
(1973). See also Gother, The Impending Probate Reform, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 417 (1973), in
which the author writes: "The members of the practicing Bar would be misleading them-
selves if they merely took the position that the California probate system is superior to either
the Uniform Probate Code or the Independent Administration of Estates Act." Id. at 422.
15. Cal. Stat. 1974, ch. 961 (codified at CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 591 to 591.7).
16. Kmiec, Probate Reform.- Caifornia's Declaration of Independent Administration, 50
S. CAL. L. REV. 155 (1976); Spitler, Un-Unform Probate. The Caifornia Version, UPC
NOTES, supra note 3, No. 14 at 1 (1975).
17. REPORT, supra note 12, at xvii-xx.
18. Id. at xxxiii.
19. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (repealed 1974).
20. CAL. PROB. CODE § 257 (West 1956).
21. Id. § 255 (West Supp. 1979).
22. See Turrentine, Introduction to the Calfornia Probate Code, WEST'S ANNOTATED
CALIFORNIA CODES, PROBATE CODE 8-21 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Turrentine]. See also
In re Shoreder's Estate, 46 Cal. 304, 319 (1873).
23. Turrentine, supra note 22, at 18-21.
24. The CPC underwent a critical reevaluation in 1931, when the California Code
Commission was charged with its revision. The Commission, however, had no authority to
do more than clarify and consolidate the code, or conform it to interpretations by the
supreme court; hence no substantial revision occurred. CALIFORNIA CODE COMMISSION,
[Vol. 31
This Article addresses the question posed by the State Bar Com-
mittee: would the UPC, if adopted, constitute an improvement over
the CPC. By comparing the sections of the UPC and the CPC which
relate to the protection of the decedent's family, to intestate succession,
and to the execution, revocation, revival, and construction of wills, this
Article evaluates whether the relevant sections of the UPC would better
serve the citizens of California than do the corresponding sections of
the existing CPC.
Protection of the Family of a Decedent
Surviving Spouse
A modern probate code, as a minimum, should assure a surviving
spouse a fair share of a decedent's estate if the decedent leaves no will,
a right to elect to take a forced share if the decedent leaves a disinherit-
ing will, and probably a right to avoid certain inter vivos transfers
made by the decedent which unduly diminish the decedent's estate.
The UPC has thoughtful and contemporary provisions covering all of
these points in a common law state. If a decedent leaves no will and is
survived by a spouse and issue who are all issue of the surviving
spouse, the spouse takes the first $50,000 and half of the balance;25 the
issue take the diminished half. If, however, the decedent's issue are not
all the issue of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse does not re-
ceive the preemptive $50,000;26 hence, the issue of a prior marriage re-
ceive more protection. If no issue of the decedent survive, then the
spouse takes all except as against parents of the decedent.27
There are two situations in which disfavored surviving spouses are
protected by the UPC. If the testator fails to provide for a surviving
spouse who married the testator after the execution of the will, the
omitted spouse receives an intestate share unless the omission was in-
tentional or the spouse was provided for outside of the will.28 If the
REPORT 10 (1930); Turrentine, supra note 22, at 27-29. See Kleps, The Revision and Codi-
cation of Calfornia Statutes 1849-1953,42 CALIF. L. REV. 766 (1954). The draftsman for the
Commission, Professor Perry Evans, was capable of modernizing and improving the CPC,
but thought he lacked the authority to do so. Evans, Comments on the Probate Code of
Caifornia, 19 CALIF. L. REv. 602 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Evans].
25. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102(3).
26. Id. § 2-102(4).
27. Id. § 2-102(l), (2). A parent or parents take half. Not even brothers or sisters share
with the spouse.
28. Id. § 2-201(a), (b). It should be noticed that this provision is analogous to preter-
mission and not considered a partial revocation as provided in CPC § 70. CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 70 (West 1956).
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decedent leaves a will which gives a surviving spouse less than one
third of the decedent's "augmented estate," the surviving spouse has a
right of election to take one third of such estate.29 The augmented es-
tate is more than the probate estate; the UPC therefore goes beyond the
provisions of many states, which only give a surviving spouse a right to
take a forced share of the net assets passing by will.3 0 This augmented
estate is comparable to the gross taxable estate under federal estate tax
law and gives to the surviving spouse the right to have various inter
vivos transfers brought back into hotchpot. 31 The concept cuts both
ways, however, requiring the surviving spouse to deduct from his or her
share gratuitous inter vivos transfers made to him or her by the dece-
dent.32 The determination of the augmented estate and the computa-
tions that are necessary for its application are complicated, and the
survivor's right of election may not be asserted often.33 If the concept
of recapturing some assets transferred inter vivos is to be accepted,
however, then the UPC provisions are fair and evenhanded. 34 As dis-
cussed below, California has accepted the idea of recapture of certain
inter vivos transfers with respect to quasi-community property,35 but in
a simplistic fashion that may cause substantial inequities.3 6
Initially, the UPC may seem irrelevant in a community property
state like California. If a decedent leaves only community property a
29. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to 2-207.
30. For a current review of the various attempts to provide an equitable share for the
surviving spouse, with a discussion of the sections in the UPC, see Kurtz, The Augmented
Estate Concept under the Uniform Probate Code.- In Search ofan Equitable Elective Share,
62 IOWA L. REV. 981 (1977). See generally T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 107 (2d ed. 1953)
[hereinafter cited as ATKINSON]; W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE (1960)
[hereinafter cited as MACDONALD]. For other contemporary views, see Gaubatz, Notes To-
ward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 MIAMI L. REV. 497, 520-24 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Gaubatz]; Kulzer, Property and the Family" Spousal Protection, 4 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 195
(1973); Spies, Property Rights of the Surviving Spouse, 46 VA. L. REV. 157 (1960).
31. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202(1). See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE art. II, part 2,
General Comment. See also Fratcher, Toward Un/form Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1037, 1050-64 (1966).
32. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202(2).
33. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202, Comment. Some doubt has been expressed
about the need for such a protective system. See Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share. A
Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1966). See also Clark, The Recap-
ture of Testamentary Substitutes to Preserve the Spouse's Elective Share: An Appraisal ofRe-
cent Statutory Reforms, 2 CONN. L. REV. 513 (1970).
34. See Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code.- In
Search ofan Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REv. 981, 1036-43 (1977). See also Peter-
son, Idaho Uniform Probate Code: Time For Some Changes, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 11 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Peterson].
35. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.8 (West Supp. 1979).
36. See note 63 infra. See Peterson, supra note 34, at 15.
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surviving spouse is well cared for whether the decedent dies intestate or
testate and regardless of whether improper transfers were made while
the decedent lived. Under present law, if a husband or a wife dies in-
testate, the surviving spouse takes all of the community property. 37 If
the decedent leaves a will which purports to disinherit the surviving
spouse, the surviving spouse may, absent waiver, claim a full half of the
community property. 38 If the decedent had attempted to make im-
proper transfers of the survivor's community property interest without
the consent of the spouse, the surviving spouse may recapture a half
interest.3 9
The relevance of the UPC in California results from the increasing
number of decedents leaving separate property40 in their estates. As
the divorce rate rises the amount of separate property in decedents' es-
tates increases, because the decedents' share of community property in
prior marriages will be separate property in later marriages and at
death.4' Decedents who lived solely on inherited capital, or capital ac-
quired before marriage, will leave only separate property at death.42
With respect to separate property, the rights of a surviving spouse
in California are wholly inadequate by standards prevailing in most
states. If the decedent dies intestate in California and is survived by a
spouse and plural children or their issue, the spouse receives only one
third of the decedent's estate;43 if there is one child or the issue of one
child, the spouse receives half of the estate.44 Even if there are no issue
the spouse takes only one half if the decedent is survived by a parent or
by any of the issue of a parent.45 Indeed, if the decedent is survived by
a spouse and a grandnephew, the grandnephew takes as much as the
37. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956). This has not always been the law in Califor-
nia. Painter v. Painter, 113 Cal. 371, 45 P. 689 (1896). Under the 1850 statute the decedent's
half would pass to his or her descendants and, if none, to his or her surviving spouse. Tur-
rentine, supra note 22, at 7. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956) (historical note).
38. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956); Estate of Murphy, 15 Cal. 3d 907, 544 P.2d
956, 126 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1976).
39. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.8 (West Supp. 1979). See 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL-
IFORNIA LAW 5206 (1974).
40. Bodenheimer, The Community without Community Propert: The Needfor Legisla-
tie Attention to Separate Property Marriages under Community Property Laws, 8 CAL. W.L.
REv. 381 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer].
41. Id. at 415.
42. Id. at 381.
43. CAL. PROB. CODE § 221 (West 1956).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 223.
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spouse. 46  Empirical studies indicate that most decedents leaving a
spouse and children would prefer to have a major part, if not all, of
their estate go to the surviving spouse.47 In apparent recognition of this
preference, some states that have reconsidered the problem recently
have been even more generous to the surviving spouse than the UPC. 48
In California, a surviving spouse still takes the same share in separate
property that a surviving widow took under the Statute of Distributions
in 1670.49 Surely attitudes have changed in 300 years.
In California a surviving spouse has no right of election to take a
share of the decedent's separate property if the testator leaves a
postmarital will in favor of others.50 If the testator's will had been exe-
cuted before marriage and did not provide for the subsequent spouse,
the surviving spouse's only claim to an intestate share would be under
the doctrine of partial revocation.5 1 A clear intention by the testator to
46. Id. The surviving spouse takes all only if there is neither a parent nor a brother or
sister or issue of a deceased brother or sister. Id. § 224.
47. For a summary of the most recent study, see Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public Atti-
tudes about Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Statutes, 1978 AM. BAR
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 321 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fellows, Simon & Rau]: "In
summary, a majority of the respondents want to leave their entire estates to their spouses
[where such spouses are the parents of the surviving children]. The findings obtained in this
study combined with prior will studies indicate that most citizens prefer distribution of the
entire estate to the spouse and are in favor of recent legislative changes so providing."
The prior studies referred to are of probated wills. The inference is that persons who
died intestate would have had similar preferences. The studies were: SUSSMAN, CATES &
SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE (1970); Browder, Recent Patterns in Testate Succes-
sion in the United States and England, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1303 (1969); Dunham, The Method,
Process and Frequency in Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 252, 258
(1963); Ward & Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 393.
In several of the more recent studies, individuals were interviewed to determine how
they would want their property to devolve upon their deaths. Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra.
See two prior studies based on interrogation of living persons: Fellows, Simon, Snapp &
Snapp, An Empirical Study of Illinois Statutory Estate Plan, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 717, referred to
as the Illinois study; Glucksman, Intestate Succession in New Jersey. Does it Conform to
Popular Expectations?, 12 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 253 (1976), referred to as the New
Jersey study.
48. See, e.g., Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2102 (West 1975); Colorado, COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-11-102 (West 1974); Montana, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-403(1)
(1964).
49. An Act for the Better Settling of Intestates Estates, 1670, 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10, § 6.
The present English law is much more favorable to the surviving spouse. See Administra-
tion of Estate Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 5, at 893 (1925), as amended by Intestates' Estate
Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 64, §§ 1-6, at 1350 (1952), andby Family Provision
Act, 1966, c. 35, §§ 1-10, at 637 (1966). See Kahn-Freund, Recent Legislation on Matrimonial
Property, 33 MOD. L. REV. 601 (1970).
50. Estate of Stewart, 69 Cal. 2d 296, 444 P.2d 337, 70 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968); Estate of
Cudworth, 133 Cal. 462, 65 P. 1041 (1901).
51. CAL. PROB. CODE § 70 (West 1956).
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exclude the spouse, however, would be controlling. Scholars over the
years have pointed out the need to afford greater protection to a surviv-
ing spouse where all or part of the decedent's estate was separate prop-
erty,52 but there has been no change in the CPC.
There has been reform, however, with respect to one type of sepa-
rate property. A generation ago so many married couples migrated to
California with separate property acquired while they were domiciled
in other states that some relief from the law governing separate prop-
erty was imperative. In 1956, the Law Revision Commission, on the
basis of a study prepared by Professor Harold Marsh, recommended
changes53 that resulted in the adoption of what are now CPC sections
201.5 to 201.8. 54 Although the property acquired by married persons in
other states was separate property under conflict of law rules, it was
denominated quasi-community property in California under the new
CPC sections.
Under the revised law a spouse is entitled to inherit all of the
quasi-community property in case of intestacy,55 to have a forced share
in half of such property against a disinheriting will, 56 and to recapture
one half of such property disposed of by the decedent gratuitously if he
or she retained "a substantial quantum of ownership and control. '57
Thus in the case of quasi-community property a surviving spouse is
given a limited right to recapture, but without setoffs; if the decedent
had made substantial inter vivos gifts to the spouse, or had provided
generously for the spouse with insurance, such a donee-spouse could,
notwithstanding such benefits, claim one half of revocable inter vivos
gifts made to other persons.58 If the concept of the augmented estate is
52. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, supra note 40, at 414-18; Turrentine, supra note 22, at 34.
53. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RELAT-
ING TO RIGHTS OF SURVIVING SPOUSE IN PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY DECEDENT WHILE
DOMICILED ELSEWHERE, I REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES, E-5 to E-39 (1956).
See also CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RELAT-
ING TO INTER VIVOS MARITAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PROPERTY ACQUIRED WHILE DOMI-
CILED ELSEWHERE, 3 REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES, 1-1 to 1-35 (1960);
CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO QUASI-COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY, 9 REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 117 to 112 (1969).
54. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 201.5 to 201.8 (West Supp. 1979). See Abel, Barry, Halstead
& Marsh, Rights ofa Surviving Spouse in Property Acquired by a Decedent While Domiciled
Outside of Calfornia, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 211 (1959).
55. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.5 (West Supp. 1979).
56. Le., the decedent has a devisable interest in only one half. Id.
57. Id. § 201.8.
58. These other persons would include such likely donees as children by a prior mar-
riage. See Kurtz, 7heAugmentedEstate Concept under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search
ofan Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981, 1036-43 (1977); Peterson, supra note
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to be used, fairness demands the setoffs authorized by the UPC.
California's community property system would not be disturbed
by enactment of the UPC.59 The adoption of the UPC, however, might
invite legislators to reconsider the devolution of the decedent's devisa-
ble one half of community or quasi-community property if the dece-
dent dies intestate. The preferable course of action might be to adopt
the law of another community property state, such as Arizona,60 or to
modify the UPC to permit one half of the community property to pass
as if it were separate property. 61 If this latter approach were followed,
the decedent's estate in a nuclear family with issue only of the decedent
and the surviving spouse often would pass to the surviving spouse as it
does now.62 However, in the troublesome cases in which the decedent
had children by a prior marriage, ie., the surviving spouse's stepchil-
dren, the division of the estate would be fairer to such children.63 Such
a change in CPC sections 201 and 201.5 would minimize the need for
CPC sections 228 and 229, considered in the next section of this Arti-
cle.64
34, at 11-18. The spouse, however, must elect against the will rather than to take benefits
under it if electing to obtain a restoration of property transferred by the decedent.
59. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-I02A (Alternative Provision for Community Prop-
erty States).
60. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2102 (West 1975).
61. UPC § 2-102A gives the surviving spouse the same share as to separate property
that was provided in § 2-102, and in regard to community property provides: "The one-half
. . . which belongs to the decedent passes to the [surviving spouse]." UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE § 2-102A. The enacting state is free to fill in the brackets as it chooses and hence
could provide that the devisable half also passes under UPC § 2-102.
62. If the issue were the issue of both the decedent and the survivor, the survivor would
take $50,000 plus half and therefore would take all or almost all of moderate estates. See
notes 25-27 & accompanying text supra.
63. That is, the decedent's children of each marriage would divide one half of the dece-
dent's estate in equal shares (per stirpes) without the preemptive $50,000 to the surviving
spouse. Professor Gibson would favor the surviving spouse even where there are children by
a prior marriage. Gibson, Inheritance of Community Property in Texas-A Needfor Reform,
47 TEX. L. REV. 359, 366-67 (1969). See Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 47, at 364-68,
suggesting that those interviewed would prefer that about two thirds be given to the surviv-
ing spouse in this situation. Until 1974, the law in Washington provided that the decedent's
half of community property would be divided between a surviving spouse and descendant,
so that such a spouse would take three fourths. By a recent amendment, all of the commu-
nity property now passes to the surviving spouse. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.04.015
(1967) (amended 1974); Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 49 WASH. L.
REV. 729, 797 (1974). This result is reasonable when the children are the children of both
spouses but is unfair to children of a prior marriage. See Sweet, Rights of a Pretermitted
Heir in Caifornia Community Propert--A Needfor Clarification, 13 STAN. L. REV. 80, 85
n.29 (1960).
64. See notes 121-40 & accompanying text infra. The UPC and the CPC do have simi-
lar provisions with respect to family allowances and exemptions. See Peterson, Family
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Adoption of the UPC in California would not necessarily change
the rights of surviving spouses with respect to community property.
The surviving spouse would, however, take a much greater share of
separate property if the decedent died intestate, and would have new
and much needed protection against disinheriting wills and inter vivos
transactions which were testamentary substitutes. With respect to
quasi-community property, the UPC would replace the simplistic and
sometimes unfair recapture provisions of CPC section 201.8 with the
more equitable provisions of UPC sections 2-201 to 2-207.65
Surviving Issue
Both the UPC and the CPC accept the common law doctrine of
freedom of testation as modified by the rights accorded to a surviving
spouse.66 Issue have no right to elect to take a portion against a disin-
heriting win 67 and, a fortiori, no right to recapture any assets disposed
of inter vivos. The only protection afforded them, beyond the inciden-
tal protection afforded by family allowance, exempt property, or home-
Rights Califamia Compared to tke Uni/orm Probate Code in COMPARATIVE PROBATE LAW
STUDIES 161 (1976). Compare CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 660, 680-684 (West 1956 & Supp. 1979)
with UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-402 to 2-404. California homestead law, however, is
quite different from the UPC, because the CPC contemplates a home while the UPC can
accommodate existing state laws and provides an alternative homestead measured in terms
of money. Peterson, Family Rifhts: Cali/ornia Compared to the Uniform Probate Code in
COMPARATIVE PROBATE LAW STUDIES 161, 161-62. Compare UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
§ 2-401 with CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 660-668 (West 1956 & Supp. 1979). See UNIFORM PRO-
BATE CODE § 2-401A.
65. For a remarkably lucid and fair treatment of all of the alternative systems which
would give to a surviving spouse the most equitable share in the combined assets of a mar-
ried couple, without excessive demands on judicial time or discretion, see GREAT BRITAIN
LAW COMMISSION, THE LAW COMMISSION PUBLISHED WORKING PAPER No. 42, FAMILY
PROPERTY LAW (1971), reprinted in 5 THE LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS (1976). See
Kahn-Freund, Law Commission: Publ&hed Working Paper No. 42: Family Property Law
1971, 35 MOD. L. REV. 403 (1972).
Even if one does not agree with his solution, one must admire the scholarly presentation
of all the issues and the authorities in MACDONALD, supra note 30, chs. 1-21. For other
suggestions, see Gaubatz, supra note 30, at 520-24; Haskell, The Power of Disinheritane."
Proposalfor Reform, 52 GEO. L.J. 499 (1964); Kulzer, Property and the Famiy: Spousal
Protection, 4 RuT-CAM. L.J. 195 (1973); Spies, Property Rights of the Surviving Spouse, 46
VA. L. REV. 157 (1960).
The California law relating to quasi-community property is somewhat more favorable
to a surviving spouse than the UPC provision because the elective share is one half instead
of one third. There is no reason, however, why the legislature could not enact UPC §§ 2-201
and 2-202 with a higher fraction both for separate and quasi-community property.
66. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *10-13; ATKINSON, supra note 30; L. SIMES,
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (6th ed. 1955).
67. Louisiana, which follows the civil law, is the only exception. See Calm, Restraints
on Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 139 (1936); Gaubatz, supra note 30, at 524.
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stead, is the pretermission statute which awards an intestate share to
some descendants who may have been omitted inadvertently from a
will. 68 This statute is based on the fiction that unless a contrary intent
is expressed clearly, the testator-parent would not omit a natural object
of bounty. In spite of their common doctrinal assumptions, however,
the pretermission sections of the two codes differ substantially.
The protection of the UPC section 69 is limited to children of the
testator, and to after-born or after-adopted children, with the single ex-
ception of a child omitted solely because the testator believed the child
to be dead.70 Issue of deceased children are not provided for. An omit-
ted child receives an intestate share unless (1) it appears from the will
that the omission was intentional; (2) when the will was executed the
testator had one or more children and devised substantially all of his or
her estate to the other parent of the omitted child;71 or (3) the testator
provided for the child by transfer outside the will and the intent that
the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by state-
ments of the testator, from the amount of the transfer, or by other evi-
dence. 72
The UPC section is consistent with the contemporary preference of
most testators who have a spouse and children to devise substantially
all of their property to the spouse. In light of this common pattern, to
give an after-born child a full intestate share while the other children
take nothing would be an obvious injustice.73
68. Mathews, Pretermitted Heirs: An Analysis of Statutes, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 748, 749
(1929).
69. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-302.
70. id. § 2-302(b).
71. The UPC section is subject to the criticism that it cuts off after-born children if
children at the time of the making of the will were not named, and additionally does not
give them a share of any amounts that may have been given to other children. Gaubatz,
supra note 30, at 528. The New York legislature followed the recommendation of the Ben-
nett Commission, BENNETT COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 4, at 2736-49, in amending its
statute to provide that, if the testator had children when the will was made but made no
provision for them, an after-born child takes nothing. If, however, the testator then had one
or more children and made legal or equitable gifts to them, then an after-born child shares
equally with them. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.2 (McKinney 1967).
72. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-302, Comment, to the effect that oral proof is
here permitted even though advancements, § 2-110, must be evidenced by a writing.
73. The typical situation justifying the need for a pretermission statute occurs when a
testator devises substantially all of his or her estate to living children, or advances each
child's share, has another child, and dies before changing the will. When, however, substan-
tially all of the estate is given to the surviving spouse, an after-born child gets an unfair
advantage under a pretermission statute. If the surviving spouse dies intestate, or with a will
with a class gift to children, the pretermitted child may take a double share and get a first
share long before the others, who take, if at all, at the surviving spouse's death.
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The California pretermission statute, CPC section 90, generally is
much more favorable to the testator's issue than the law in most states
and the UPC, because it applies to living and after-born children and
to the issue of deceased children.74 Professor Evans, the draftsman of
the 1931 Revision, has said that section 90 "does as much harm as
good."' 75 If intention of the testator is the proper test, then section 90
fares poorly as that intention is frustrated as often as it is carried out.
76
The latest supreme court case on the issue, Estate of Gardner,77 sup-
ports Professor Evans' view. In Gardner, the testator had had two chil-
dren but, at the time she executed her will, one child had died, survived
by three children (testatrix's grandchildren). The testatrix not only de-
vised all of her estate to her only living child, but stated in her will: "I
declare that I have intentionally failed to provide for any person not
mentioned herein." The court held that under the statute, the
grandchildren were entitled to a share of her estate, patently contrary
to the testatrix's intention.78
The State Bar committee has conceded that there was "considera-
ble merit to the proposal to eliminate the section 90 protection for the
child who is alive at the time the will is executed." 79 The most appeal-
ing case for an exception arises where there is evidence that the testator
thought the child to be dead,80 or evidence that a testator did not know
of the birth of a child, 81 but slight revisions of UPC section 2-302(b)
would cover these cases.
Section 90 has caused an inordinate amount of litigation due not
only to its atypical provisions but also because of the burden of proof
74. CAL. PROB. CODE § 90 (West 1956).
75. Evans, Should PretermittedIssue be Entitled to Inherit?, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 269
(1943).
76. Professor Evans pointed out that in the past testators with large families might have
unintentionally omitted one of their living children or grandchildren, but that omission is
not as likely to happen in the small families of today. Evans, Should Pretermitted Issue be
Entitled to Inherit?, 31 CALIF. L. REv. 263, 265 (1943). See Estate of Gardner, 21 Cal. 3d
620, 580 P.2d 684, 147 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1978); Gaubatz, supra note 30, at 524-28.
77. 21 Cal. 3d 620, 580 P.2d 684, 147 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1978).
78. Id. at 623, 580 P.2d at 686, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 186. Compare Gardner with Estate of
McClure, 214 Cal. App. 2d 590,29 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1963), and Van Strien v. Jones, 46 Cal. 2d
705, 299 P.2d 1 (1956).
79. REPORT, supra note 12, at 34.
80. See, e.g., Estate of Torregano, 54 Cal. 2d 234,352 P.2d 505, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1960).
81. See, e.g., Estate of Smith, 9 Cal. 3d 74, 507 P.2d 78, 106 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1973).
Estate of Torregano and Estate ofSmith were relied on by the supreme court in Estate of
Gardner, 21 Cal. 3d 620, 580 P.2d 684, 147 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1978). The fiction that the testa-
tor did not intend what was said, because of possible mistake about the facts, seems more
plausible in these cases than in Gardner.
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imposed by the courts on the claimant to demonstrate that the testator
had in mind all persons protected by section 90 when various terms of
disinheritance were used.82 Difficulties also have arisen in applying
section 90 to community property,83 and in cases involving the interac-
tion of section 90 with section 92, the anti-lapse statute, for example,
where the testator gave to a named child a nonexistent residue, or a
nominal sum of money, and the child died before the testator, leaving a
child.84
Even if the California law is not always "intent fulfilling" it is not
necessarily wrong as a matter of public policy. In 1929 Professor Rob-
ert E. Mathews in his classic article on pretermission posed the question
of whether the only relief against disinheritance of issue should be the
pretermission statutes. 85 He was impressed by the Family Maintenance
Acts then being adopted in some parts of the British Commonwealth.86
There now has been enough experience in England, New Zealand,
Australia, and Canada under these acts to demonstrate that freedom of
82. See cases cited notes 76, 78, 80 & 81 supra.
83. See Sweet, Rights ofa Pretermitted Heir in Caifornia Community Property-A Need
for Clariocation, 13 STAN. L. REV. 80 (1960) (recommending a general review of § 90).
84. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 90, 92 (West 1956). Compare Estate of Matthews, 176
Cal. 576, 169 P. 233 (1917) with Estate of Frinchaboy, 108 Cal. App. 2d 235, 238 P.2d 592
(1951). See also Estate of Roberts, 9 Cal. App. 3d 747, 88 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1970).
85. Mathews, Pretermitted Heirs.- An Analysis of Statutes, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 748
(1929). Professor Max Radin has stated: "In the nineteenth century, however, a modified
legitim was created by the pretermission statutes. .. " M. RADIN, HANDBOOK ON ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 417 (1936). Professor Dainow, in Dainow, Inheritance by
Pretermitted Children, 32 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1937), after considering cases which qualified the
alleged freedom of testation, concluded: "In any event, there is a basic common denomina-
tor between the American and civil law systems in the disapproval of the power of disinheri-
tance; The difference is a matter of degree." id. at 10.
86. The pioneer act was adopted in New Zealand in 1900 and later spread to Australia
and most provinces of Canada. WRIGHT, TESTATOR'S FAMILY MAINTENANCE IN AUSTRA-
LIA AND NEW ZEALAND (2d ed. 1966); Dainow, Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Austra-
lia and Canada, 36 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1938).
The Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 45, was adopted in
England after many years of debate and over considerable opposition of British judges and
lawyers. See Dainow, Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in England, 25 CORNELL L.Q.
337 (1940). See also MACDONALD, supra note 30, ch. 21.
The 1938 Act was amended in 1975, Inheritence (Provision for Family and Depen-
dents) Act, 1975, c. 63, after extensive study by the Law Commission. See GREAT BRITAIN
LAW COMMISSION, THE LAW COMMISSION PUBLISHED WORKING PAPER No. 42, FAMILY
PROPERTY LAW, 5 THE LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS (1976). For British comment,
see Samuels, Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, 39 MOD. L. REV.
183 (1976). For the leading American commentary, see Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testa-
mentary Freedom-A Report on Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 277
(1955). See also Note, Family Maintenance: An Inheritance Scheme/or the Living, 8 RUT.-
CAM. L. REV. 673 (1977).
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testation can remain substantially unimpaired even if a decedent's es-
tate cannot escape liability for the maintenance of dependents whom
the decedent morally or legally was obligated to support when alive.87
The administration of such acts has not proved as burdensome as
feared.18 Moreover, the Bennett Commission in New York recom-
mended the adoption of a Family Maintenance Act limited to chil-
dren.89 The recommendation was approved by the New York Senate
but failed to become law. Although no American jurisdiction has yet
adopted a Family Maintenance Act, there is a need for further study of
such legislation.90
While UPC section 2-302 appears superior to CPC section 90,
neither statute meets the need shown by experience. The allowance of
an intestate share may provide too much or too little, be fair or unfair,
carry out or frustrate intent.9' While the compassion of the California
courts may be admired, to achieve a contemporary policy California
87. The 1975 amendment to the English statute increased the number of dependents
who may apply for an order to provide enough for subsistence to include children born out
of wedlock and even stepchildren who are dependent members of the decedent's family.
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act, 1975, c. 63. Except for spouses, the
allowance from the estate is limited to subsistence, on an objective standard. Samuels, In-
heritance (Provisionfor Family and Dependents) Act 1975, 39 MOD. L. REv. 183, 183 (1976).
88. MACDONALD, supra note 30, at 292-94; Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary
Freedom-A Report on Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARv. L. REV. 277 (1955).
89. BENNETT CoMMISSioN REPORTS, supra note 4, at 2004-06, 2076-79.
The Act was restricted to dependent children, with no provision for a surviving spouse,
and was expressly coordinated with the pretermission statute. The Act left the pretermission
statute in operation for a will executed before the effective date of the Act, but applied to a
decedent who died after the date of the Act, leaving a later will or without a will, and having
made no reasonable provision for the maintenance of a dependent child. In such a case, the
court might in its discretion make a reasonable provision out of the decedent's estate for the
maintenance of such child. The Act set forth definitions, standards, and the factors that
might be considered by the court. The Act followed the general plan of the British Com-
monwealth statutes except that it was limited to a minor child or to an adult child with a
mental or physical disability. The Act included adopted and illegitimate children who were
entitled to inherit but not stepchildren even if dependent. The court in its discretion could
refuse to entertain an application under the Act.
90. A watered-down version of the Act also failed in New York. See Foster, Freed &
Midonick, Child Support: The Quick and the Dead, 26 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1157, 1186-94
(1975). The new section would have provided that a child support order would impose an
obligation enforceable against the parent's estate. Under New York Family Court Act § 513
a support order for children born out of wedlock may be enforced against the putative par-
ent's estate. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT (29A) § 513 (McKinney 1975). "[It is ironic that children
born out of wedlock fare better against an obligor's estate than do legitimate children."
Foster, Freed & Midonick, supra, at 1181. See Calm, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PA.
L. REv. 169 (1936); Laube, The Right of a Testator to Pauperize His Helpless Dependents, 13
CORNELL L. Q. 559 (1926).
91. Gaubatz, supra note 30, at 520.
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needs a statute different than both CPC section 90 and UPC section 2-
302, and more akin to a limited family maintenance act.
Intestate Succession
By what criteria should intestate succession statutes be judged?
Such statutes should be clear and simple; they should not attempt to
provide for all of the complex alternatives that might be covered by
wills. Because succession statutes provide the estate plan for the major-
ity of persons, such statutes should be comprehensible to any intelligent
person and should provide for a distribution that the average decedent
probably would have wanted if an intention had been expressed by
will.
In considering intestate succession statutes their importance in the
law of wills and trusts should not be ignored because many instruments
provide for a final gift to the heirs of the donor or of some other speci-
fied person. The term "heirs" generally is construed according to the
statute on intestate succession.92 Furthermore, the persons who have
standing to contest wills are usually those who would take by intestate
succession. 9
3
The UPC sections on succession are brief, clear, internally consis-
tent, and yet contain several important reforms. Like the statutes in
England94 and in some states, 95 inheritance is not unlimited; the
"laughing heir" is cut off,96 and inheritance is restricted to the relatives
whom the decedent probably knew and had an interest in, i e., none
beyond grandparents and their descendants. 97 There are many practi-
cal advantages to such a rule, especially in the administration of estates
and trusts.98 The escheat to the state of such remote interests is not
unreasonable when one considers that estate taxes now deprive even
92. CAL. PROB. CODE § 108 (West 1956); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 1-201(17), 2-
611. The problem is more likely to arise since the doctrine of worthier title has been abol-
ished and heirs take by purchase. CAL. PROB. CODE § 109 (West Supp. 1979); CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1073 (West Supp. 1979).
93. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 370 (West Supp. 1979). Even absent a meritorious case, a
distant relative may contest a will in the hope of obtaining a settlement. For an extreme
example, see Matter of Wendel, 143 Misc. 480, 257 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1932), in which over
1600 claimants appeared. See generally ATKINSON, Supra note 30, at 34.
94. See generally Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23.
95. Model Probate Code, supra note 5, § 22, Comment (citing statutes).
96. Cf Cavers, supra note 2, at 208-13 (criticizing unlimited inheritance).
97. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-105 & General Comment following.
98. In probate, the delay and expense of attempting to find remote missing heirs is
eliminated, and problems of service of notice are minimized. In the administration of trusts,
which include gifts to "heirs," there are advantages in having a finite class in litigation which
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the closest and dearest relatives at rates of up to seventy percent.99
Moreover, the drafters of the UPC had the advantage of modem schol-
arship and contemporary codes in drafting clear and simple rules of
representation l°° and in eliminating anachronisms such as the ancestral
property doctrine and the disfavored status of half-bloods. 01
The CPC has been modernized in several individual sections gov-
erning succession, 0 2 but most of the existing sections were copied from
the Texas code in 1850 or the Field Code in 1872.103 Inheritance is
unlimited, however remote the heir may be.1°4 The doctrine of repre-
sentation, often confusing in American codes, ' 0 5 probably is more con-
fused in California than in any other state. The CPC retains several
aspects of the ancient ancestral property doctrine. Several sections in-
volving representation and succession based on source of property are
examined in detail to demonstrate that the whole chapter, and not just
a few sections, should be reconsidered.
Representation
Representation under the UPC is the same for the descendants of
the decedent, descendants of his or her parents, or descendants of his or
her grandparents, except if both paternal and maternal grandparents
survive the decedent, or leave descendants who do, one half of the de-
involves modification or termination of trusts or in.proceedings for construction, settlement
of accounts, and the like. Further, there is less need for guardians ad litem.
99. There are policy reasons for supporting a higher tax for more remote relatives.
Jatscher, The Aims of Death Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY (E.
Halbach, Jr. ed. 1977).
100. Section 2-106 states the doctrine with clarity and consistency: "If representation is
called for by this Code, the estate is divided into as many shares as there are surviving heirs
in the nearest degree of kinship and deceased persons in the same degree who left issue who
survive the decedent, each surviving heir in the nearest degree receiving one share and the
share of each deceased person in the same degree being divided among his issue in the same
manner." UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-106.
101. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-107. Other innovations include the requirement that
heirs survive the decedent by 120 hours. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-104 & Comment.
The State Bar Committee has drafted a proposed amendment to the CPC along similar
lines. REPORT, supra note 12, at 30.
102. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 255, 257 (West 1956 & Supp. 1979).
103. Turrentine, supra note 22, at 8-22.
104. CAL. PROB. CODE § 226 (West 1956).
105. See Model Probate Code, supra note 5, § 22(c), Comment. The difficulty in devel-
oping a simple, consistent law of representation probably results from the differences be-
tween limited representation under the Statute of Distributions, CAL. PROB. CODE § 221
(West 1956), and unlimited representation under the parentelic system of the Canons of
Descent. See ATKINSON, supra note 30, at 37-74; Eagleton, The Intestacy Act, 20 IowA L.
REv. 244 (1935).
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cedent's estate goes to each line. The CPC sections on representa-
tion, 0 6 as interpreted, are in need of reconsideration as they apply to
lineal descendants of the decedent, to the descendants of parents, and
to the descendants of grandparents.
The CPC states the rule of representation among lineal descend-
ants of the decedent in the traditional form when one or more children
survive the decedent, and then continues: "[Blut if there is no child of
decedent living at his death, the remainder goes to all of his lineal de-
scendants; and if all of the descendants are in the same degree of kin-
dred to the decedent they share equally, otherwise they take by right of
representation." 107 Thus, if one or more children survive the decedent,
and one or more children with issue predecease the decedent, the divi-
sion is per stirpes with the decedent's children as the stocks. If only
grandchildren survive, they take equally, per capita, regardless of how
many grandchildren were in each child's family. If, however, a
grandchild with issue should predecease the decedent with other
grandchildren still living, the generations being unequal, the division is
per stirpes, but not with the grandchildren as the stocks, as under the
UPC and the general American law, 10 8 but rather with the original
children as the stocks. Although this rule does little harm in intestate
succession-few testators are durable enough to be survived only by
grandchildren and the issue of deceased grandchildren-it has con-
trolled the devolution of some substantial estates in California where
the ultimate gift in a trust was to the settlor's heirs as determined by
reference to the statute of intestate succession.109
Although the CPC permits grandchildren to take equally if no
children survive the decedent, this is not so for nephews and nieces,
even where no brothers or sisters survive and the nephews and nieces
are therefore of the same generation."10 The stocks of the brothers and
sisters are maintained through all generations."' On the other hand,
106. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 221-222 (West 1956).
107. CAL. PROB. CODE § 221 (West 1956).
108. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-103(1); see ATKINSON, supra note 30, at 64-65.
109. See Lombardi v. Blois, 230 Cal. App. 2d 191, 40 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1964); Maude v.
Catherwood, 67 Cal. App. 2d 636, 155 P.2d 111 (1945). Matude contained the famous error
involved in the trust created by Chief Justice S. Clinton Hastings.
110. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 225, 228, 229 (West 1956 & Supp. 1979); Estate of Frear, 180
Cal. App. 2d 829, 4 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1960).
111. The strong popular preference for having all issue in the same generation share
equally is demonstrated in the survey of public attitudes in Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra
note 47, at 368-84. Presumably this attitude would prevail in the case of other heirs when
representation applied. These findings would justify the change in the UPC § 2-103 sug-
gested in Waggoner, A Proposed A/ternatie to the Uniform Probate Code's Systemfor Intes-
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there is no representation at all if the nearest relatives are an aunt or
uncle and cousins who are the children of a deceased aunt or uncle." 2
Succession Based on Source
While modem succession statutes provide a scheme of inheritance
based on the relationship of possible successors to the decedent, older
codes provide for the return of some real property to the blood line of a
former owner. The feudal canons of descent limited the inheritance of
land to those of the blood of the first purchaser, the ancestor who had
brought the land into the family." 13 Inheritance based on the source of
title has disappeared from modem codes" 4 but, oddly, is retained in
several sections of the CPC.
The first section, CPC section 227, was part of the Wills Act of
1850 and provides that if an unmarried minor child dies and leaves an
estate acquired by succession from a deceased parent, such property
passes to the other children of the deceased parent, or their issue, and
not to the surviving parent'1 5 who normally would inherit under CPC
tate Distribution Among Descendants, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 626 (1971). The Joint Editorial
Board, the committee which oversees the development of the UPC, favored the proposal as a
recommended change in the Code if an adopting state did not enact § 2-103 as written. The
Waggoner system provides for per capita distribution in each generation, regardless of the
number in each family. For example, if two of three children predeceased the decedent, one
leaving one child and the other three, the estate would be divided one third to the living
child, and two thirds to the grandchildren, each one taking one fourth of the two thirds. The
scheme would be the same with collateral relatives so far as representation is allowed. The
Waggoner proposal would change the law in California as to the decedent's issue if in une-
qual degrees, and among the issue of brothers and sisters whether equal in degree or not.
112. CAL. PROB. CODE § 226 (West 1956); Marlow v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 2d 393,
110 P.2d 11 (1941).
The difference between the two codes is dramatically illustrated in the estate of the late
Howard Hughes. He reportedly was survived by a maternal aunt of advanced years and
many cousins, the children of deceased maternal and paternal aunts and uncles. If Mr.
Hughes were held to have died intestate domiciled in California, all of his estate would have
passed to the maternal aunt. CAL. PROB. CODE § 226 (West 1956). Had he died domiciled
in a state with the UPC, cousins would have represented their deceased parents, with one
half of the estate being divided among each of the maternal and the paternal lines. UNI-
FORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-103(4), 2-106.
113. ATKINSON, supra note 30, at 77-8I; Simes, Ancestral andNon-AncestralReally under
the Ohio Statutes of Descent, 2 U. CIN. L. REV. 387 (1928).
114. See Model Probate Code, supra note 5, § 22, Comment. Neither the MPC nor the
UPC has any remnant of the doctrine. States that once had some part of the doctrine tend to
limit or abandon it. See, e.g. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.01 (Page 1976). See also In re
Costello's Estate, 147 Misc. 629, 265 N.Y.S. 905 (Sur. Ct. 1933), pointing out that former
§ 90 of the Decedent Estate Law, similar to CPC § 254, was abolished by § 81 of the Dece-
dent Estate Law in 1929. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW (repealed 1967), reprinted in N.Y.
EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW app. 1 (McKinney 1967).
115. CAL. PROn. CODE § 227 (West 1956); see Evans, supra note 24, at 613-14.
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section 221. The policy behind CPC section 227 makes little sense. Mi-
nor heirs usually would need a guardian to manage such estates, bur-
dening them with the attendant expense and inconvenience. Even
though the section is difficult to defend, 1 6 it remains in the code.
The policy concerning succession by half-bloods has changed over
the last century. Modern codes treat half-bloods the same as full
bloods."l 7 There have been times, however, when half-bloods have had
no rights, have received half portions, or have been in a class below full
bloods of the same degree."18 CPC section 254 provides that half-
bloods take equally with full bloods, except that where property has
been acquired from an ancestor, half-bloods not of the blood of the
ancestor yield to relatives of an equal degree who are of the blood of
the ancestor. This section is patently disfavored by the courts and has
been restricted by judicial legislation to particular real property derived
from the ancestor." 19 Even as restricted the section is anachronistic and
sometimes is impossible to apply logically. 120
The sections of the CPC which have caused the greatest confusion
and the most litigation are those which attempt to alter ordinary suc-
cession when the intestate decedent has left property formerly owned
by a predeceased spouse. 12 1 These sections involve a type of "ancestral
property doctrine" unknown at common law.
The original section, the predecessor of CPC section 228, was ad-
ded in 1880. As explained by Professor W.W. Ferrier, Jr.:
116. The draftsman of the 1931 revision saw no reason for the section, but had no au-
thority to make substantive changes. CAL. PROB. CODE § 221 (West 1956); see Evans, supra
note 24, at 613. See note 24 supra.
117. Model Probate Code, supra note 5, § 24, Comment.
118. Cf. ATKINSON, supra note 30, at 74 (some jurisdictions still treat half-bloods differ-
ently than full bloods).
119. Estate of Ryan, 21 Cal. 2d 498, 133 P.2d 626 (1943); see 31 CALIF. L. REV. 334
(1943). The California Court of Appeal has recently declined an invitation to reexamine the
decision in Ryan. Estate of Hoegler, 82 Cal. App. 3d 483, 147 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1978).
120. See, e.g., In re Nidever, 181 Cal. App. 2d 367, 5 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1960). The dece-
dent was survived by a half-brother and the children of a deceased sister. Since the property
had come from the decedent's mother, the sister, had she lived, would have taken to the
exclusion of the half-brother. The court, noting the conflict with § 253, which states brothers
are related in the second degree and nephews in the third degree, gave half to the half-
brother and half to the sister's children by representation. Id. at 385-86, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 354-
55.
121. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 228-229 (West Supp. 1979), § 230 (West 1956). While this
Article was at press, CPC §§ 228 and 229 were amended by the California legislature. 1979
Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 298. The sections were clarified but remain subject to the basic criti-
cisms discussed herein. Section 229(c), formerly § 229(b), is more clearly a partial reversion
to, and extension of, the ancestral property doctrine, because the section is not limited to
separate property attributable to a predeceased spouse.
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Its effect was simply this: if the property had been community prop-
erty of the decedent and a predeceased spouse and the decedent was
a widow or widower who had no relatives, instead of the property
escheating to the state, as it had theretofore, it was provided that it
should go to certain designated relatives of the predeceased
spouse.122
In 1905, legislation extended the coverage of the section to include the
separate property of the predeceased spouse as wel as the community
property of the decedent and the predeceased spouse.' 23 The sections
that have evolved, frequently amended and often litigated, have proved
to be, as Professor Ferrier said, "productive of complexities, anomalies
and injustices in the law of descent."' 24
Present section 228 relates to the community property of the dece-
dent and the predeceased spouse that had passed to the decedent by
survivorship or by other specified means. If the decedent dies intestate
with neither spouse nor issue surviving, such property goes to the issue
of the prior marriage, or if none, one half to the parents of the decedent
or their descendants by representation and the other half to the parents
of the predeceased spouse or their descendants by representation. Sec-
tion 228, in conjunction with sections 230 and 296.4, provides for vari-
ous alternatives if the predeceased spouse left no parents or their
descendants but the decedent has left blood relatives, however re-
mote. 25 On the other hand, relatives of the predeceased spouse, more
remote than parents and their descendants, might take if the decedent
has no blood relatives.126
Section 229 concerns the predeceased spouse's separate property
that has been acquired by the decedent. If the decedent dies intestate,
leaving neither spouse nor issue, such property goes to the issue of the
prior marriage, or if none, to the predeceased spouse's parents or their
descendants. If there are no descendants of parents, the property goes
to the blood relatives of the decedent, or if none, to relatives of the
predeceased spouse more remote than the issue of parents. 27
The following extraordinary subsection, section 229(b), was added
in 1970 and provides that if the decedent leaves neither issue nor
spouse, that portion of the decedent's intestate estate acquired by gift,
122. Ferrier, Rules f Descent under Probate Code Sections 228 and 229, and Proposed
Amendments, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 261, 261 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Ferrier] (discussing
former § 1386(9) of the California Civil Code).
123. Cal. Stat. 1905, ch. 949, § 1386(8), at 608.
124. Ferrier, supra note 122, at 261.
125. See, e.g., Estate of McDill, 14 Cal. 3d 831, 537 P.2d 874, 122 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1975).
126. CAL. PROB. CODE § 228 (West Supp. 1979).
127. Id. § 229(c).
September 19791 PROBATE REFORM
descent, devise, or bequest from a parent or a grandparent, goes to the
parent or grandparent, or if dead, "in equal shares to the heirs of such
deceased parent or grandparent." z12 8 This crudely drafted, obscure sub-
section may be a revival of the ancestral property doctrine in modem
dress.' 29 The subsection is not limited expressly to property acquired
from or through a predeceased spouse; it applies to personal property
as well as to real property. 30 Taken literally, this subsection means
that whenever a person dies intestate, leaving neither spouse nor issue,
the estate must be sorted out so that all land, stocks and bonds, and
other personal property which came by gift, devise, or inheritance di-
rectly from the separate property of a parent or grandparent must pass
by a special rule of succession based on the source of title and not on
relationship. This rule exceeds even the feudal ancestral property doc-
trine which was limited to land.
These sections relating to the property of a predeceased spouse are
based on three implicit premises: (1) That if there are no blood rela-
tives of the surviving spouse, the property acquired from the prede-
ceased spouse should go to relatives by affinity rather than escheat to
the state. This was the original purpose of the section.' 31 (2) That the
general rule of intestate succession that all community property passes
to the surviving member of the community may be unfair to some of
the predeceased spouse's relatives, especially to issue by a prior mar-
riage. 132 (3) That property acquired from a parent or a grandparent
128. Id. § 229(b). While this Article was at press, § 229(b) was amended and is now
designated § 229(c). The amendment did not eliminate the ancestral property doctrine at-
tributes of the section. See note 121 supra. Section 229(b) has recently been before the
California Court of Appeal in a case of first impression, Estate of Hoegler, 82 Cal. App. 3d
483, 147 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1978). The facts squarely raised the question of whether § 229(b)
was restricted to a case involving property acquired from a predeceased spouse, or was ap-
plicable to any separate property acquired directly from a parent or grandparent. The court
properly held that §§ 228 and 229 should be interpreted together, but decided the case on a
strained definition of "separate property" as used in § 229(a) and (b), instead of deciding
that § 229(b) was restricted to property acquired from a predeceased spouse.
The court clearly thought that §§ 228 and 229(a) and (b) should be construed together
but by its narrow holding left open the most important question: Assume that a parent or
grandparent makes a direct gift of separate property to a child or grandchild; must that
property, real or personal, pass by a special rule of succession, i.e., § 229(b), and not by the
general rule of §§ 221-226? See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 221-226, 228, 229 (West 1956 & Supp.
1979).
129. The text refers to "gift, descent, devise or bequest from the separate property of a
parent or grandparent." See CAL. PROB. CODE § 229(b) (West Supp. 1979); Estate of
Hoegler, 82 Cal. App. 3d 483, 491, 147 Cal. Rptr. 289, 294 (1978).
130. See Estate of Ryan, 21 Cal. 2d 498, 133 P.2d 626 (1943).
131. Ferrier, supra note 122, at 261.
132. See notes 40, 63 & accompanying text supra.
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should, in the absence of a spouse or issue of the intestate, return to the
ancestral line of descent.
The first premise is quite rational; to avoid escheat, the property of
the second spouse to die might well descend to the relatives of the first
spouse if the second spouse leaves no blood relatives. Other states have
such statutes, although they are more simply stated.133
The second premise would be better served by reexamining the
basic rule of intestate succession governing the devisable half of com-
munity property on the death of the first spouse, with the goal of pro-
tecting children of a prior marriage. As suggested earlier, the rule of
succession in some other community property states might be prefera-
ble to the relevant CPC sections.' 34
The third premise, that ancestral property-should be restored to
the blood line, is anachronistic. As suggested earlier, the revival of the
ancestral property doctrine, as well as its extension to personal prop-
erty, is contrary to all current scholarly opinion.135
The primary reason for the elimination of sections 228 and 229 is
that the justifiable purposes of the sections can be accomplished more
simply. These sections, persistently amended and enlarged, have be-
come too complex and difficult to apply. Any attempt through intestate
succession statutes to create the refined and esoteric distinctions found
in sections 228 and 229 is bound to create uncertainty and may lead to
capricious results. 136 Further, these sections can produce some quite
133. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.010(3) (Vernon 1956); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2105.06 (Page 1976).
134. See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
135. See Model Probate Code, supra note 5, § 22, Comment.
136. Ferrier, supra note 122, at 263-71. Prior to 1937 there was a provision for the issue
of such a subsequent marriage but no provision for a subsequent spouse. The amendments
which followed Professor Ferrier's criticisms have introduced new injustices by favoring the
subsequent spouse or the issue of such spouse, even if by prior marriage, over the children of
the predeceased spouse by prior marriage. Estate of Lima, 225 Cal. App. 2d 396, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 404 (1964).
Other capricious consequences are also possible. Assume that A had a son B by his first
wife and that later A married C and they had a son D. When A died the community prop-
erty owned by A and C went to C under CPC § 201, and the separate property of A was
devised by A to C. When C died, intestate, she was survived by her stepson B and her son
D. All of the property acquired from A would pass to her son D and none to her stepson B
because C was survived by issue. The result would be the same if D had been the child of C
by an earlier marriage, Estate of Lima, 225 Cal. App. 2d at 398-99, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 405, or
by a marriage after A's death. Or had C married E late in life and was survived only by her
stepson B and by her new husband E, E would have taken all.
If the second wife C died intestate without issue and without a spouse, even though she
had a sister, F, all of the former community property and all of the separate property would
go to her stepson B and none to her sister F.
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unexpected consequences when there are gifts to heirs under wills and
trusts. 137 Assume that a testatrix acquired property from her prede-
ceased husband and at her death devised it "to my heirs at law." As-
sume further that she was survived by a sister and by a stepson, her
husband's child by a prior marriage. The testatrix probably would pre-
fer that her sister take under her will but her "heir" under section 229 is
her stepson. The plight of the stepchild, especially when in an in loco
parentis relationship, certainly deserves attention but not in the oblique
and partial manner of these sections. 38 Finally, sections 228 and 229
have caused difficult problems when applied to property acquired in
common law states. 139
CPC Division II, and especially Chapter 2 (Separate Property)
cannot be saved by mere patchwork. The time has come to repeal the
present sections and to start over. The UPC sections are clearly supe-
rior, but even these sections well might be improved to better protect
the dependents of a decendent. t4°
If, however, C were survived only by A's nephew G and by her sister F, all of the
separate property and half of the community property would go to G and only half of the
community property would pass to her sister F.
If, however, C were survived only by A's cousin, and by her cousin, all would go to her
cousin. Estate of McDill, 14 Cal. 3d 831, 537 P.2d 874, 122 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1975).
If, however, C were survived only by A's cousin, and no blood relatives of her own, all
would go to A's cousin.
For even more complex examples, see Estate of Simmons, 64 Cal. 2d 217, 411 P.2d 97,
49 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1966); Estate of Westerman, 62 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1967), vacated, 68 Cal. 2d
267, 66 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1968). See cases cited notes 137-38 infra.
137. See Estate of Page, 181 Cal. 537, 185 P. 383 (1919); 7 HASTINGS L.J. 336 (1956).
See also Estate of Taff, 63 Cal. App. 3d 319, 133 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1976).
138. In Estate of Lima, 225 Cal. App. 2d 396, 37 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1964), the court said:
"Stepchildren simply have not been embraced within the meaning of the word 'issue' as used
in Probate Code section 222. . . . While the status of adopted and illegitimate children has
been dealt with by the Legislature. . . the status of stepchildren has not been disturbed, and
we must take the law as we find it." Id. at 398-99, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 405 (citations omitted).
See Note, Stepchildren and In Loco Parentis Relationshps, 52 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1939).
139. For example, assume that H and W accumulated an estate in New York which
would have been community property if so acquired in California. After H's death, W mi-
grated to California having succeeded to the property. When W later died intestate in Cali-
fornia, H's son by a prior marriage was entitled to take the property in preference to the
blood relatives. Estate of Perkins, 21 Cal. 2d 561, 134 P.2d 231 (1943) (4 to 3 decision). See
Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L. REV. 719, 733-42 (1961);
Schreter, Quasi-Community Property in the Conflict of Laws, 5 CALIF. L. REV. 206, 238
(1962); Note, Applicability of California Probate Code Sections 228 and 229 to Property Ac-
quired under Laws of Jurisdictions Not Recognizing Community Property, 31 CALIF. L. REV.
331 (1943).
140. See Note, Stepchildren in Loco Parentis Relationshps, 52 HARV. L. REV. 515
(1939); see note 87 & accompanying text supra.
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Wills
The CPC sections on wills also remain much as they were when
they were copied from the Texas code in 1850 or from the Field code in
1872; 141 they retain the earlier codes' basic philosophy, extensive detail,
and quaint phraseology. 42 The modem reform codes are simpler,
clearer, and have fewer traps for the inexperienced drafter. 143 The
UPC has reduced the formal requirements both for witnessed wills and
for holographic wills to a safe minimum. It has simplified the law of
revocation, returned to the rule of the ecclesiastical courts with respect
to the revival of revoked wills, and reexamined a number of incidental
topics such as anti-lapse, exoneration, and rules of construction. 144
Execution
The UPC provides that all attested wills "shall be in writing signed
by the testator or in the testator's name by some other person in the
testator's presence and by his direction, and shall be signed by at least
two persons each of whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's
acknowledgment of the signature or of the will."I 45 It provides further
that any person generally competent may be a witness to a will and that
neither the will nor any provision thereof shall be invalid because it is
signed by an interested witness.'" A holographic will is valid if the
signature and the material provisions are in the handwriting of the tes-
tator. 147 CPC section 50 has nine requirements for an attested will. 148
141. Turrentine, supra note 22, at 8-13.
142. French & Fletcher, A Comparison of the Uniform Probate Code and Caiffornia Law
with Respect to the Law of Wills, in COMPARATIVE PROBATE LAW STUDIES 331, 331 (1976).
143. In 1946, § 47 of the MPC retained essentially the same formal requirements for the
execution of wills as the CPC. One of the most respected scholars in the field of probate law,
the late Professor Philip Mechem, responded vigorously with his classic article, in which he
urged the elimination of the formal requirements that experience had shown were unneces-
sary. Mechem, Why Not a Modern WillsAct, 33 IOWA L. REV. 501 (1948). His suggested
reform statutes are closely followed in the UPC. Other scholars support the Mechem view
or go beyond it. See Gaubatz, supra note 30; Kossow, Probate Law and the Unform Code:
"Onefor the Money... " 61 GEO. L.J. 1357 (1973).
In a recent article Professor Langbeih makes a persuasive case for extending the doc-
trine of substantial compliance to wills. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills
Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975).
144. For a detailed comparison of the CPC and the UPC, see French & Flether, A Com-
parison ofthe Unform Probate Code and California Law with Respect to the Law of Wills, in
COMPARATIVE PROBATE LAW STUDIES 331 (1976).
145. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-502.
146. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-505.
147. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-503.
148. A will, other than a nuncupative will, must be (1) in writing and (2) other than a
holographic will, subscribed (signed) by the testator or by some other person in his or her
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Many wills which would have satisfied the UPC minimums have been
denied probate because they have failed to comply with one or more of
the CPC requirements, even when there was no reasonable doubt about
the testator's intent and no suspicion of fraud. 49
Judges and scholars have criticized some of the nine requirements
in section 50, questioning the materiality of a request by the testator
that the witnesses sign,' 5° a declaration that the document is the testa-
tor's will,' 5 1 a requirement that the two witnesses be in the presence of
each other,'52 and the requirement that the will be signed "at the end
thereof.'' 53 Furthermore, now that interested witnesses in general are
not barred from testifying in court, if a witness to a will is interested,
there is little reason not to allow that interest to go only to the credibil-
ity of the witness without requiring a forfeiture of any part of a de-
vise.154  While lawyers undoubtedly will continue to have wills
executed with all of the traditional ceremony, and for good reasons be-
yond validity,155 should testators be frustrated if they comply with the
basic requirements of the UPC?
The UPC authorizes a self-proved will and provides a form for the
presence and by his or her direction (3) at the end thereof (4) Such subscription must be
made or acknowledged in the presence of both witnesses together. (5) The testator must
declare to the witnesses that the writing is his or her will. (6) Two witnesses must sign (7) at
the end of the will (8) at the, request of the testator (9) and in his or her presence (not
necessarily in the presence of each other). CAL. PROB. CODE § 50 (West 1956).
149. See generally Mechem, Why Not a Modern Wills Act, 33 IOWA L. REV. 501 (1948);
Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1975).
150. See Estate of Johnson, 100 Cal. App. 676, 280 P. 987 (1929).
151. See Estate of Silva, 169 Cal. 116, 145 P. 1015 (1915); Estate of Lorenz, 136 Cal.
App. 2d 239, 288 P.2d 578 (1955).
152. Prior to 1931 the CPC did not expressly require both witnesses to be present when
the testator signed or acknowledged his or her signature. Evans, supra note 24, at 605-06.
153. There has been some debate over whether the statute means the end of a will is its
physical or rhetorical end. Compare Estate of Seaman, 146 Cal. 455, 80 P. 700 (1905) with
Estate of Chase, 51 Cal. App. 2d 353, 124 P.2d 895 (1942). See also Estate of Howell, 50 Cal.
2d 211, 324 P.2d 578 (1958); Estate of Tonneson, 81 Cal. App. 2d 703, 185 P.2d 78 (1947);
ATKINSON, supra note 30, at 303. In In re Beadle, [19741 1 W.L.R. 417, the testatrix signed
at the top and placed the will in an envelope which she sealed and signed. The judge "re-
gretfully" declared the will invalid.
154. For the long and confusing history of the requirements of "credible" and "compe-
tent" witnesses, and the purging statutes, see ATKINSON, supra note 30, at 308-20. See also
Estate of Tkachuk, 73 Cal. App. 3d 14, 139 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1977). The State Bar Committee
does not think the witness requirements should be changed, at least not if informal probate
without notice is accepted. REPORT, supra note 12, at 44.
155. For analyses of the policy reasons underlying the formal requirements for the exe-
cution of wills, see Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1
(1941); Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975);
Mechem, Why Not A Modern WillsAct?, 33 IOWA L. REV. 501 (1948).
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acknowledgment of the testator and for affidavits of the witnesses made
before "an officer authorized to administer oaths" either when the will
is executed or subsequent thereto. 156 This provision, approved by the
California State Bar committee, 157 is proving popular even in states not
ready to adopt the UPC.158
Holographic wills were not permitted in California under the
Wills Act of 1850,159 but were permitted after 1872 as provided in the
Field Code.160 The 1850 act had rather elaborate provisions for nuncu-
pative wills for persons in danger, which might have been quite neces-
sary in a pioneer society.' 6 1 With holographic wills permitted, there
seems to be scant reason today why nuncupative wills should not fol-
low deathbed oral wills into history.' 62
The California courts have, in some ways, been most indulgent
with testators who have written their own wills, permitting the integra-
tion of separate pages, even though obviously written at different times
on different types of paper and with different colors of ink.' 63 Interline-
ations have been permitted, even if made at later times.' 64 But the
courts have relentlessly adhered to the statutory requirement of a
date, 65 and have rejected unattested handwritten wills that have any
printing, stamping, or typing that the testator considered part of the
will, even if the words were not essential to the testator's meaning.' 66
156. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-504.
157. REPORT, supra note 12, at 45. See also CAL. PROB. CODE § 329 (West Supp. 1979).
158. UPC NOTES, supra note 3, No. 22 at 3.
159. See Turrentine, supra note 22, at 9-13.
160. id. at 20.
161. Id. at 9-10. The present restricted statute is CAL. PROB. CODE § 54 (West 1956).
162. See Rheinstein, The ModelProbate Code: A Critique, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 534, 550
(1948).
163. Estate of Dumas, 34 Cal. 2d 406, 210 P.2d 697 (1949); Estate of Phippen, 238 Cal.
App. 2d 241, 47 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1965).
164. Estate of Finkler, 3 Cal. 2d 584, 46 P.2d 149 (1935).
165. Estate of Wunderle, 30 Cal. 2d 274, 181 P.2d 874 (1947); Estate of Carpenter, 172
Cal. 268, 156 P. 464 (1916); Estate of Hazelwood, 249 Cal. App. 2d 263, 57 Cal. Rptr. 332
(1967).
A California court sustained a will dated "4/12/17th" in Estate of Olssen, 42 Cal. App.
656, 184 P. 22 (1919), although some courts have refused probate to wills unless either of the
first two numbers was 13 or more. Succession of Beird, 145 La. 756, 82 So. 881 (1919); see
Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 866 (1968).
The State Bar Committee criticized the UPC for not retaining the requirement of a date
for holographic wills, even though a date is not required for attested wills. REPORT, supra
note 12, at 44.
166. The early cases went to an extreme, rejecting holographic wills with any printing or
stamping. Estate of Bower, 11 Cal. 2d 180, 78 P.2d 1012 (1938); Estate of Thorn, 183 Cal.
512, 192 P. 19 (1920). Even after the amendment to CPC § 53 in 1931 and the liberal deci-
sion in Estate of Baker, 59 Cal. 2d 680, 381 P.2d 913, 31 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), there are still
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Logically, however, if a holographic will is permitted, the statutes
should not contain traps that a reasonable layperson would not antici-
pate.
Revocation
The CPC section1 67 relating to revocation by act to the instrument
is similar to that of the UPC,168 but the two codes differ on revocation
by operation of law and by later inconsistent instruments. Revocation
by operation of law in marital status cases is restricted in California to
a premarital will which does not make provision for a contemplated
spouse. 169 At the time of the Field Code, divorce was much less com-
mon than it is today. The failure to provide for the revocation of de-
vises to a spouse in the event of a divorce is a serious defect in any
contemporary code. Such a provision was included in the MPC,170 and
is included as the only type of revocation by operation of law in the
UPC.171 This change in California law was suggested by Professor Ev-
ans in 1931,172 but the legislature has yet to act. 173
problems when the testator considers the printed or typed words to be part of the will, even
though not material to the meaning. See Estate of Christian, 60 Cal. App. 3d 977, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 841 (1976); Estate of Helmar, 33 Cal. App. 3d 109, 109 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1973).
167. CAL. PROB. CODE § 74 (West 1956).
168. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-507.
169. CAL. PROB. CODE § 70 (West 1956).
170. Model Probate Code, supra note 5, § 53.
171. Section 2-508 revokes any "disposition or appointment" made by a prior will if the
testator is divorced or the marriage is annulled. This change of circumstance also revokes
any nomination of the former spouse as a fiduciary unless the will expressly provides other-
wise. Property not passing to a former spouse passes as if the former spouse failed to survive
the testator. The meaning of the terms "divorce," "annulment," and "separation" are made
clear by § 2-802. The period between a complete property settlement in anticipation of a
divorce and the divorce is covered by a useful section, § 2-204, which provides that the
spouses may by a written contract after fair disclosure waive all rights of a surviving spouse,
including a renunciation of all benefits by intestate succession or by prior will. UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE § 2-508.
The UPC also has a renunciation section, § 2-801, based on the Uniform Disclaimer of
Transfer by Will, Intestacy or Appointment Act of 1973. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801.
172. Evans, supra note 24, at 610. See also Note, The Effect of Diorce on Wills, 40 S.
CAL. L. REV. 708 (1967).
173. The State Bar Committee approved the concept of partial revocation by divorce
and stated that legislation was being considered by the Probate and Trust Law Committee.
REPORT, supra note 12, at 45.
The opinion in Estate of Murphy, 92 Cal. App. 3d 413, 154 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1979), dem-
onstrates the need in California for provisions like UPC §§ 2-508, 2-802, and 2-801. In
Murphy, the decedent was survived by his parents, by his divorced wife, and by her son by a
prior marriage. The testator, whose 1972 will left his entire estate to his wife or alternatively
to her son, had entered into a marital settlement agreement with his wife in 1975 in which
each waived and renounced "any and all rights to inherit the estate of the other at the other's
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The methods of revocation provided by CPC section 74 are exclu-
sive. This section, in conjunction with CPC section 350 relating to the
proof of missing wills, illustrates a substantial defect of the CPC. If, for
example, a testator should telephone his or her lawyer and ask that the
testator's will be destroyed and the lawyer should comply, the will
would not be revoked because the act was not in the presence of the
testator as expressly required by CPC section 74. If the will is not re-
voked, its admissibility to probate by proof of its contents, as by sub-
mission of a copy, is questionable. Section 350 permits such proof only
if the will was in existence at the death of the testator or was destroyed
"fraudulently or by public calamity" during his or her lifetime.
The California Supreme Court in the famous case of Estate of
Cuneo, 174 permitted a will to be proved by a copy although the original
will had been destroyed by the testatrix. The court unanimously held
that the will had not been revoked because of the application of the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation. 175 Unfortunately, however,
section 350 was not mentioned by the court and apparently not by
counsel. 76 The idea that a will is not revoked but cannot be proved is
unsatisfactory. Chief Judge Fuld, referring to a similar statute, has ex-
plained that "to speak of a destroyed will which is valid and unrevoked
but which may not be admitted to probate is legal sophistry unless the
refusal to admit it is based on reasonable doubt as to whether the will
was really the testator's wil."'177 There was no provision comparable to
death, or to receive any property of the other under a Will executed before the effective date
of this Agreement." 92 Cal. App. 3d at 418, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 862 (emphasis omitted). The
testator and his wife were divorced in 1976 and the decree adopted the agreement. The
decedent died in 1977 without revoking his 1972 will, and his former wife received one fifth
of the estate and renounced the balance in a compromise agreement with the decedent's
parents. The former wife's son, arguing the marital settlement agreement in effect required
that the estate pass as if the former wife had predeceased the decedent, claimed as the con-
tingent beneficiary. The court held the wife's right to take under the will was not affected
either by the divorce or by the settlement agreement. The court indicated that the decedent,
by leaving the will intact, in effect made a new will after the 1975 agreement. The case
illustrates that there is enough confusion in the law to justify a code section like UPC § 2-
204 in addition to a revocation-by-divorce section like UPC § 2-508. See note 171 supra.
174. 60 Cal. 2d 196, 384 P.2d 1, 32 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1963).
175. Id. at 204, 384 P.2d at 6-7, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 413-14.
176. See Estate of Strickman, 247 Cal. App. 2d 469, 55 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1966). For a
discussion of judicial construction of CPC § 350, see Note, Lost or Destroyed- What Consti-
tutes Fraudulent Destruction?, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 156 (1951).
177. Matter of Fox, 9 N.Y.2d 400, 410, 174 N.E.2d 499, 510, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405, 414
(1961). Justice Traynor, in his dissent in Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal. 2d 221, 236, 143 P.2d 689,
696 (1943), made the best defense possible for § 350 when he wrote: "[The legislature] has
placed upon the testator the responsibility for the safekeeping of his will until his death." In
Bristol there was doubt as to whether the testamentary instrument was in existence at the
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section 350 in the MPC, nor is there one in the UPC. The repeal of
section 350 in California has been recommended repeatedly, 78 but the
code has not been changed.
Revival
CPC section 75 has been construed to provide that a revoked will
can be revived only by reexecution.179 This section may not have been
quite so drastic when first enacted: The meaning of revival by the
"terms of such revocation"180 and whether "republication" could be by
oral declaration, were unclear. Now, however, when a second will has
been revoked with the intent to revive the first will, the only relief that
might be afforded in California would be to avoid the revocation of the
second will by application of the doctrine of dependent relative revoca-
tion,181 clearly unsatisfactory as a sole solution.
Because of the severity of section 75 the courts sometimes have
strained to call the second will, if only partially inconsistent with the
first, a codicil to the first, so that the revocation of the "codicil" would
leave the first will in effect.' 8 2 For example, assume a first will giving a
legacy to A, a legacy to B, and the residue to X, and a second giving a
legacy to B, a legacy to C, and the residue to X. If the second instru-
ment were destroyed, would the first will be completely effective? As
Professor Evans has pointed out, at least the legacy to A should have
been revoked, and not revived under section 75. 183
At common law, the revocation of a revoking will automatically
revived the first. 184 The ecclesiastical courts held that the prior will was
revived if such an intention could be proved.185 The UPC, by adopting
the latter rule, gives effect to the testator's intention in a way which is
no more informal than the proof permitted under the doctrine of de-
pendent relative revocation. 86
testator's death. In Cuneo and in the hypothetical case suggested, all the facts were known
and the only issue was one of law; whether the will was revoked.
178. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 24, at 611; Turrentine, supra note 22, at 38; Note, Statu-
tory Restrictions on Probate of Lost Wills. Judicial Inroads on Restrictions, 32 CALIF. L. REV.
221 (1944) (citing 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2523 (3d ed. 1940)).
179. In re Lones, 108 Cal. 688, 41 P. 771 (1895).
180. Turrentine, supra note 22, at 10; ATKINSON, supra note 30, at 478.
181. See Estate of Callahan, 251 Wis. 247, 29 N.W.2d 352 (1947); Palmer, Dependent
Relative Revocation and its Relation to Relieffor Mistake, 69 MICH. L. REV. 989 (1971).
182. Estate of Schnoor, 4 Cal. 2d 590, 51 P.2d 424 (1935).
183. Evans, supra note 24, at 611-12.
184. ATKINSON, supra note 30, at 474.
185. Id. at 474; see Ferrier, Revival of a Revoked Will, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 265 (1940).
186. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-509, Comment.
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The California anti-lapse statute, CPC section 92, also should be
improved, at least to settle the law about its application to void and
lapsed legacies in class gifts. The court of appeal decision in Matter of
Steidl' 87 reaches a limited, albeit sound, result with respect to a lapsed
legacy, but a comprehensive section like the UPC provision would set-
tle the law as to both lapsed and void legacies. 188
A companion problem involves the residue of a residue rule: If a
residuary devise is made to two or more named devisees and one pre-
deceases the testator, his or her share, unless saved by section 92, passes
by intestacy. CPC section 120 presumes that the testator intended to
have all of the estate pass under a residuary clause, but the section has
been construed to retain the ancient residue of a residue rule. 189 Re-
cent reform codes, including the UPC 190 and some state court opin-
ions, 191 have abolished the rule. 192
Conclusion
Since the last major revision of the CPC in 1872 there have been
many changes in the American family and in the attitudes and expecta-
tions of its members. Many more marriages end in divorce; 193 more
decedents have had plural families; more decedents leave adopted chil-
dren, stepchildren, children born out of wedlock, relatives of the half-
blood, and unmarried companions. 194 Decedents who have been di-
vorced are more likely to have separate property in their estates than
187. 89 Cal. App. 2d 488, 201 P.2d 58 (1948).
188. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-605, Comment.
189. Estate of Russell, 69 Cal. 2d 200, 444 P.2d 353, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968).
190. See, e.g., BENNETT COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 4, at 495-511; UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE § 2-606.
191. See, e.g., Corbett v. Skaggs, III Kan. 380, 207 P. 819 (1922); Inre Slack Trust, 126
Vt. 37, 220 A.2d 472 (1966).
192. In addition to the problems with the CPC already discussed, scholars have sug-
gested a provision for nonexoneration when mortgaged property is devised. Turrentine,
supra note 22, at 40; see UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-609. The present case law is satisfac-
tory so long as a testator is not personally liable on the bond. Estate of Brown, 240 Cal.
App. 2d 818, 50 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1966). A statutory rule governing the inclusion in class gifts
of adopted and illegitimate children also would be helpful. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-
611. On the other hand, scholars recommend deleting certain rules of construction in the
CPC which do more harm than good. Turrentine, supra note 22, at 37-39. See also Estate of
Russell, 69 Cal. 2d 200, 444 P.2d 353, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968); Estate of White, 9 Cal. App.
3d 194, 87 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1970); Comment, Extrinsic Evidence and the Construction of Wills
in California, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1962).
193. See Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L.
REV. 1169, 1202 (1974).
194. See Cogswell & Sussman, Changing Family and Marriage Forms, 21 THE FAMILY
COORDINATOR 505 (1972). According to this study, the normal families with children con-
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decedents survived by their first spouses. More decedents have lived on
inherited capital than in a pioneer society. More have moved to Cali-
fornia with property acquired elsewhere and have left separate prop-
erty or quasi-community property in their estates. 95 Changes have
resulted from the acceptance of equal rights for women, 96 and from
the emerging recognition that decedents have obligations to society to
support an increasing number of dependents. 97 In single marriage
families there is more of a tendency for a decedent to want an estate to
pass to a surviving spouse than to be divided between a spouse and
issue. 198 The CPC has, of course, adapted to some changes, but not in a
consistent, coordinated fashion.
A comparison of the two codes shows that to repeal most of Divi-
sion I and II of the CPC and start anew would be far better than to
change a number of individual sections. A simpler, more contempo-
rary code such as the UPC could then be used as the basis for reform.
If changes in the existing code must be made section by section,
however, a number of sections should be the subject of special study by
the Law Revision Commission or by committees of the State Bar. Such
a procedure has been recommended previously. Professor Evans sug-
gested seventeen changes in the nonprocedural area after the revision
in 1931,199 and Professor Turrentine suggested sixteen in 1956 in his
Introduction to the Probate Code.20° Almost all of the suggestions have
merit; very few have been adopted. The principal reason for the failure
of the legislature to act is that most of the changes, standing alone, do
not seem important enough to compete with more pressing demands.
Notwithstanding these political realities, this author considers fifteen
revisions essential:
1. A surviving spouse should be given a forced share of separate
stituted 44%; remarried, 15%; experimental marriage, 8% (increasing to 15% by 1980). See
also Burgess, The Family in a Changing Society, 53 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 417 (1948).
195. Abel, Barry, Halstead & Marsh, Rights of a Surviving Spouse in Property Acquired
by a Decedent While Domiciled Outside Caifornia, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 211, 211 (1959) (citing
COMMONWEALTH CLUB, THE POPULATION OF CALIFORNIA 130 (1946)).
196. See Johnston, Sex and Property. The Common Law Tradition, the Law School Cur-
riculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1033 (1972); Comment,
Community Property: Male Management and Women's Rights, 1972 LAW & SOC'L ORDER,
163, 166-67 (1972).
197. See Trimble v. Gordon, 431 U.S. 762 (1977); Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate
Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decisions on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. Cm.
L. REV. 338 (1969).
198. See note 47 & accompanying text supra.
199. Evans, supra note 24, at 607-15.
200. Turrentine, supra note 22, at 34-39.
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property and a right to recapture a share of such property disposed of
inter vivos in the same way that quasi-community property can be re-
captured under CPC section 201.8, or, better yet, the concept of the
augmented estate in UPC section 2-202 should be adopted for both sep-
arate and quasi-community property.20'
2. CPC section 90 (pretermission) should be repealed and UPC
section 2-302 or, preferably, a limited family maintenance act
adopted.20 2
3. CPC sections relating to the intestate share of a surviving
spouse should be modified to provide that the devisable half of com-
munity property and quasi-community property shall not all pass to the
surviving spouse where the decedent is survived by the issue of a prior
marriage.20 3
4. Inheritance after the issue of grandparents should be abol-
ished as provided in UPC section 2-105.204
5. CPC sections 220-226 relating to intestate succession should be
repealed and the rules of succession and representation in UPC sec-
tions 2-101, 2-102A, 2-103, 2-106 adopted instead.20 5
6. The remnants of the ancestral property doctrine should be
abolished; CPC sections 227 and 229(b) should be abolished and sec-
tion 254 recast to make half-bloods equal to full bloods, as in UPC
section 2-107.206
7. CPC sections 228, 229, and 230 should be repealed and a sec-
tion added allowing inheritance by relatives of a predeceased spouse in
default of relatives by blood, and reconsidering the status of stepchil-
dren in an in locoparenis relationship.20 7
8. CPC sections 50 (formal wills), 53 (holographic wills), and 54
(nuncupative wills) should be repealed and UPC sections 2-502, 2-503,
and 2-505 adopted.20 8
9. A section similar to UPC section 2-508, providing for revoca-
201. See notes 61-64 & accompanying text supra. As suggested in note 65 supra, the
fraction in UPC § 2-202 might be changed from one third to one half so that it would not be
necessary to distinguish separate from quasi-community property in an estate. For a discus-
sion of a surviving spouse's share in various states, see Gibson, Inheritance of Community
Property in Texas-A Needfor Reform, 47 TEx. L. REv. 359, 362-63 (1969).
202. See text accompanying notes 66-91 supra.
203. See text accompanying notes 60-64 supra.
204. See text accompanying notes 94-99 supra. See Cavers, supra note 2.
205. See text accompanying notes 106-12 supra.
206. See text accompanying notes 113-20 supra.
207. See text accompanying notes 121-39 supra.
208. See text accompanying notes 145-66 supra.
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tion by divorce, and a section similar to UPC section 2-204, clarifying
the law relating to the effect of marital property settlements, should be
added.20 9
10. CPC section 350 (lost or destroyed wills) should be re-
pealed.210
11. CPC section 75 (revival) should be repealed and UPC section
2-509 adopted.21'
12. CPC section 92 (anti-lapse) should be repealed and UPC sec-
tion 2-605 adopted.212
13. The residue of a residue rule should be abolished and UPC
section 2-606 adopted. 213
14. A general provision for equitable prorationing and abate-
ment such as UPC section 3-902 should be added, or at least the equita-
ble apportionment provision of section 91 extended to cover section 70
together with recasting CPC sections 750-753.2 14
15. CPC sections 105 and 106 (construction) should be repealed
and sections similar to UPC sections 2-109 and 2-611 added.
215
Although the substantive provisions of the UPC could be adopted
separately, and the CPC could be improved by a series of amendments,
California should take a bolder course. There is a need for a complete
reexamination of the substantive and procedural law relating to family
property, succession, wills, and the administration of estates. The most
effective way to proceed, as demonstrated in other states and countries,
is for the legislature to appoint a temporary commission, perhaps along
the lines of the Bennett Commission in New York.216 The commission
might be directed, as a special commission recently was in Maine, to
recommend, after due consideration of the probate laws of other states
and the UPC, a revision and rearrangement of existing laws relating to
estates and administration, with the purpose of presenting to the legis-
lature "a fully modem, integrated and consistent Probate Code. ' '217
209. See text accompanying notes 171-73 supra.
210. See text accompanying notes 174-77 supra.
211. See text accompanying notes 179-86 supra.
212. See text accompanying notes 187-88 supra.
213. See text accompanying notes 189-91 supra.
214. See, e.g., Estate of Buck, 32 Cal. 2d 372, 196 P.2d 769 (1948); Estate of Stevens, 27
Cal. 2d 108, 162 P.2d 918 (1945).
215. See note 192 text supra.
216. See note 4 supra. See LAw REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT, LEGISLATIVE Doc.
No. 65, 19 (1977).
217. Godfrey, The Maine Commission on Revision of the Probate Code, UPC NOTES,
supra note 3, No. 20 at 3.
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Such a commission, with an adequate budget, could finance stud-
ies, hold hearings, gather supporting data,218 publish drafts of proposed
legislation, and develop public interest in reform. Its legislative mem-
bers would be responsive to grassroots pressure for change.219 Further,
practicing and academic lawyers on the commission would have the
benefit of the vast literature which has accumulated from reform move-
ments in other states and countries.
Most of the problems raised in this Article which relate to intestate
succession and wills could be easily resolved by a special commission.
A substantial consensus as to the preferable rules has developed and is
embodied in the UPC. The difficulty is largely one of getting the right
legislative sponsorship.220
There are, however, some very difficult problems in the manage-
ment and devolution of family property that have been only tangen-
tially considered here. Many commentators would prefer a special
legislative commission to undertake a major study of the California law
of community property that has been developing since 1850.221 Now
that retroactive changes are apparently permissible, 222 questions are be-
ing asked about whether the community property system can be modi-
fied to accommodate the equal rights of women,223 whether separate
control of community property is workable,224 and whether newer
218. Apparently it is not known how much of the property in decedents' estates consists
of community property, quasi-community property, and separate property, and how the mix
changes with the size of estates or has changed in recent years.
219. For accounts of political activities of the American Association of Retired Persons
and other organizations, see UPC NOTES, supra note 3, No. 20 at 7; No. 21 at 5-6.
220. See generally Cavers, supra note 2, at 214-15.
221. Bodenheimer, supra note 43; Knutson, California Community Property Laws: A
Pleafor Legislative Study andReform, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 240 (1966); Prager, The Persistence
of Separate Properly Concepts in California'r Community Property System, 1849-1975, 24
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 82 (1976). See also a vigorous criticism by Professor Richard B. Powell
in Powell, Community Propert-a Critique of lts Regulation of Intra-Family Relations, II
WASH. L. REV. 12, 38 (1936).
222. In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427
(1976); Reppy, Retroactivi y of the 1975 California Community Property Reforms, 48 S. CAL.
L. REV. 977 (1975).
223. Barham, Equal Rights for Women Versus the Civil Code, 48 TUL. L. REv. 560
(1974); Younger, Not Equal Yet, 13 IDAHo L. REv. 227 (1977); Younger, Community Prop-
er/, Women and the Law School Curriculum, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 211 (1973); Comment, The
Equal Rights Amendment and Inequality Between Spouses under the California Communimy
Property System, 6 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 66 (1973).
224. Bingaman, The Community PropertyAct of1973: A Commentary and Quasi-Legisla-
tive History, 5 N.M. L. REV. 1 (1975); Cross, Equalityfor Spouses in Washington Community
Property Law-1972 Statutory Changes, 48 WASH. L. REV. 527 (1973); McKnight, Texas
Community Property Law-Its Course of Development and Reform, 8 CAL. W.L. REV. 117
(1971); Younger, Louisiana Wives: Law Reform to Their Rescue, 48 TUL. L. REV. 567 (1974).
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forms of marital property sharing might be better.225 Some commenta-
tors question whether reform of community property laws is not com-
ing too late, as the complete equality of women may lead to more
emphasis on separate property.226 Others claim that the flexible fea-
tures of the family provision acts in British Commonwealth nations
should be considered, at least as far as dependent children are con-
cerned.227
If a high-level commission would consider all of these problems
with the same thoroughness that commissions have considered them in,
for example, England,228 the contribution to California and to many
other states229 would be timely and extremely valuable.
225. See Bartke, Community Property Law Reform in the United States and in Canada-
A4 Comparison and Critique, 50 TUL. L. REV. 212, 251-56 (1976). Foster & Freed, Marital
Property Reform in New York: Partnership of Co-Equals 8 FAM. L. Q. 169 (1974); Prager,
Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1977);
Comment, Spouses and Their Property under Swedish Law, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 553 (1963).
226. Glendon, Is There a Futurefor Separate Property? 8 FAM. L. Q. 315 (1974); Prager,
Sharing Princioles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1977).
227. MACDONALD, supra note 33, at 299-327; see also Gaubatz, supra note 33, at 551-54;
BENNETT COMMISSION REPORTS, supra note 4, at 2004-06.
228. See generally UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to 2-207.
229. Only a major state could be expected to finance a project of the required magni-
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